Joint Task Force Guantánamo (JTF-GTMO) operates at the U.S. military installation known as Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, located on the southeastern coast of Cuba. The United States operates the base under a long-standing lease agreement with Cuba that allows the U.S. military to maintain and administer the installation.

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States government selected Guantanamo Bay as a detention site for individuals captured during counterterrorism operations abroad. Beginning in early 2002, detainees associated with al-Qaeda who were captured during military operations in Afghanistan were transferred to newly established detention facilities at the base. Additional detainees captured in later operations, including during the conflict in Iraq, were also held there.

Guantanamo Bay was chosen in part because the United States already maintained a secure and isolated military installation at the site. Its location outside the U.S. mainland provided a controlled environment for detention operations while avoiding the political and security concerns associated with housing suspected terrorists within the territories of the United States or allied nations. As a result, the base became the central location for detaining certain individuals captured in overseas counterterrorism operations.

357th Military Police Company’s deployment 2013-2014

During 2013–2014, the 357th Military Police Company, a U.S. Army Reserve unit based in Concord, California, deployed to support detention operations with Joint Task Force Guantánamo at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba. While assigned to the Joint Detention Group, the company assisted in the day-to-day management and security of the detention facilities housing individuals captured during overseas counterterrorism operations. Soldiers from the unit performed typical military police duties within the detention environment, including supervising detainee housing areas, escorting detainees during movements within the facility, and maintaining overall security and accountability. The deployment concluded in early 2014, when the unit transferred authority to the 346th Military Police Company and returned to the United States after completing its mission. 

Here is one of the uniforms worn during this mission. The Army Combat Uniform (ACU) worn by a Staff Sergeant (He requested anonymity) from the 357th Military Police Company during the unit’s 2013–2014 deployment to Joint Task Force Guantánamo at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. The noncommissioned officer served as a Watch Commander, supervising guards assigned to Camp V and overseeing the daily security operations of the detention facility. For operational security (OPSEC), personnel assigned to detention duties typically did not wear their personal name tapes on their uniforms. Instead, this Staff Sergeant wore a tape labeled “Watch Commander,” while junior enlisted guards often wore identification numbers rather than names. The uniform displays the Shoulder Sleeve Insignia of the 11th Military Police Brigade, the brigade headquarters under which the 346th Military Police Company served during the mission. Although the deployment supported the broader counterterrorism mission associated with Operation Enduring Freedom, service members assigned to Guantánamo Bay did not qualify for the Shoulder Sleeve Insignia–Former Wartime Service (commonly known as a combat patch). However, personnel deployed to the installation were typically eligible for the Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal and received hostile fire or imminent danger pay during their deployment.

This post is sponsored by LaFave Glass Company. https://lafaveglass.com

U.S. Navy

Coming soon.

From late 2009 to November 2010, the 86th Infantry Brigade Combat Team deployed to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The brigade operated primarily in eastern Afghanistan, conducting counterinsurgency and security operations in a rugged and insurgent-contested region. Their mission focused on protecting the population, disrupting Taliban activity, securing key terrain and supply routes, and supporting reconstruction and stability efforts.

Attached to the brigade, the 1st Battalion, 102nd Infantry Regiment, a Connecticut Army National Guard mountain infantry battalion, conducted mounted and dismounted patrols, partnered with Afghan National Army and police units, and maintained a steady presence in local villages. They worked to reduce insurgent influence, improve security, and help Afghan forces take greater responsibility for their own areas.

Sergeant First Class Gary LaBelle served as the 1-102nd’s communications NCOIC and was based at Forward Operating Base Mehtar Lam, the battalion’s main FOB. From there, he helped keep communications running across the entire area of operations. Soldiers under him were spread out at smaller combat outposts and other FOBs, maintaining radios, satellite phones, and equipment, and handling the routine daily frequency changes. SFC LaBelle flew weekly to Jalalabad and Bagram to meet with brigade staff and coordinate communications support. He also served as a Field Ordering Officer, traveling monthly to Bagram to pick up large amounts of Afghan currency that were used to pay local vendors and inject money into the local economy.

This was Scott Meehan’s third deployment to Iraq. Assigned to the U.S. Department of Defense, he was stationed in Baghdad’s Green Zone, where he led a team of Iraqi employees auditing contracts tied to the former regime. His work focused on uncovering how Saddam Hussein’s government manipulated procurement deals, imposed kickbacks, and concealed illicit proceeds- while also searching for and accounting for funds hidden in Saddam’s palaces.

This Desert Combat Uniform (DCU) has a unique and seldom-seen patch: “U.S. Army personnel assigned to DOD and Joint Activities,” worn by soldiers who do not have a specific unit patch. It applies to personnel assigned to joint organizations that operate outside traditional U.S. Army command structures.

Saddam Hussein exploited the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program, a humanitarian program, which was created in 1995 to ease humanitarian suffering in Iraq after sweeping UN sanctions were imposed.

Those sanctions followed Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, which led to the U.S. led coalition war known as Operation Desert Storm. After the war, the United Nations Security Council maintained strict economic sanctions on Iraq due to its weapons programs and the regime’s violent repression of internal uprisings, including attacks on Kurdish and Shiite populations. The Oil-for-Food Program was designed to allow Iraq to sell limited amounts of oil under UN supervision to purchase food, medicine, and humanitarian supplies.

Although oil revenue went into a UN-controlled account, Saddam’s government imposed illegal surcharges on oil buyers, demanded kickbacks from companies selling humanitarian goods, and smuggled oil outside the program.

Investigations after 2003-particularly by the Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program led by Paul Volcker- found Iraq earned roughly $10 billion illegally through these schemes. Investigators concluded that these illicit revenues largely benefited Saddam’s regime rather than providing relief to the Iraqi population.

Sources:

-All I Could Be, Scott Meehan

-Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme (Volcker Report, 2004-2005)

-United States Government Accountability Office (GAO reports, 2004)

-United Nations Security Council Resolutions (1990-1995)

-Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder: “The Iraq Oil-for-Food Scandal”

In December 1990, during the buildup to Operation Desert Storm, Lt. Scott Meehan deployed to Saudi Arabia with the 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne), 8th Psychological Operations Battalion, serving as a Military Intelligence officer. Initially stationed in Riyadh, his primary responsibility was monitoring incoming intelligence message traffic from frontline units. He analyzed field reports and compiled intelligence summaries for the battalion commander.

As coalition forces prepared for offensive operations, Major Thomas Gerblick, the lead offensive planner for Lieutenant General Walter Boomer of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), recognized the need for dedicated Psychological Operations (PSYOP) support alongside ground combat units. He requested PSYOP assets from the 4th Psychological Operations Group. He formed 26 loudspeaker teams consisting of 46 Army PSYOP soldiers, 27 U.S. Marines, and several Kuwaiti linguists. They delivered surrender appeals, instructions, and strategic messaging directly to Iraqi forces.

These teams were deployed forward with ground combat elements in the Saudi desert near the Kuwait border, where I MEF was staging for the liberation of Kuwait. Lt. Scott Meehan was among the Army personnel reassigned to this forward position. In addition to supporting psychological operations efforts, he played a role in intelligence collection by questioning captured enemy prisoners of war. He and his team also interrogated early defectors to gather intelligence and assess the morale of Iraqi forces prior to the advance into Kuwait. These interviews revealed that the coalition air campaign had produced a substantial psychological impact on Iraqi troops, significantly degrading their confidence and willingness to fight. The team relayed this assessment to higher headquarters, reporting that only light resistance was anticipated once ground operations began.

Scott later shared an interesting account: “When more than three thousand prisoners arrived at Kibrit EPW camp, there were only about one hundred Puerto Rican National Guardsmen (MPs), along with a few special teams, manning the facility. We found one detainee who spoke perfect English and told us he was an American from Detroit who wanted to go home. He said he had been visiting his cousins in Baghdad and was at a club when Saddam’s troops raided the place, rounded up all the men over eighteen, loaded them onto a truck, and transported them to the front lines.”

Sources:

-Meehan, Scott. All I Could Be. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2011.

-Scott Meehan, conversation with Jeremy Albright, February 20, 2026

-U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm (History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps)

During October 2003 to August 2004 (OEF III), 1st Battalion, 501st PIR, assigned to the 172nd Infantry Brigade, deployed to eastern Afghanistan. The battalion operated jn Khost Province and Pakistan Province, with FOB Salerno as its primary base. During this rotation, 1-501 fell under the operational command of Combined Joint Task Force 180 (or CJTF-180).

The battalion’s primary objectives were to deny insurgent cross-border movement from Pakistan, secure key population centers, and protect FOB Salerno and surrounding supply routes. 1-501 conducted continuous dismounted and mounted patrols, cordon-and-search missions, and engagements with local tribal leaders to support stabilization efforts. During the deployment, the unit experienced several small to mid-sized engagements, including ambushes along mountain roads and raids on insurgent weapons caches and rocket launch sites, which required platoon and company-level combat actions across rugged terrain.

Equipment as worn by 1-501: The unit hadn’t gotten any new MOLLE equipment other than OTV/IBA body armor so they had to make do with their outdated LC-2 equipment. Based on the analysis of reference photos, it would appear that many of soldiers had Tactical Tailor’s “split front” MAV chest rigs, either out of pocket or “unit purchase”. It was likely cheaper to purchase the chest rig alone and use the issued “not-so-quite comparable” LC-2 pouches on them than purchasing the complete Tactical Tailor MAV kit.

Unfortunately, I am still searching for the original PASGT helmet cover with black square diamond shaped patch, as worn by them, to complete this display.